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4.1 Introduction
Since the early 1980s, dramatic changes in export commodity markets,
shocks associated with price declines, and changing views on the role of the
government have ushered in widespread market-liberalization programs
to agricultural commodity markets in Africa. These programs have signif-
icantly reduced government participation in marketing and pricing of ex-
port commodities. Market liberalization entails a greater reliance on mar-
kets to direct resource utilization and investment. In the context of this
paper, market liberalization refers to steps taken toward opening domestic
and export markets to competition and toward putting in place public and
private institutions consistent with and supportive of private markets.1
Critics have raised several concerns about the trend toward market lib-
eralization. These include the claim that, although liberalization may make
sense for an individual exporting country, when several countries do it si-
multaneously, they increase exports so strongly that they drive down the
prices and revenues that they receive from exporting and make themselves
worse oﬀ. Critics also sometimes argue that liberalization has opened
farmers up to price and income ﬂuctuations from which they were previ-
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1. Bates (1989) notes that markets adjust automatically, leaving the realignment of govern-
ment institutions as the real task of structural adjustment.ously insulated. Economic theory makes it clear that all these problems
can arise in particular circumstances, so the real questions are empirical.
This chapter provides some answers by exploring one case of primary-
commodity liberalization in some detail: cocoa in West Africa. We show
that such distributional issues are of ﬁrst-order importance to the political
debate about globalization.
We need to distinguish between liberalization and globalization. Liber-
alization is the move to market-determined prices from what was previ-
ously a regulated regime. One of the implications of liberalization is that
the prices received by farmers in diﬀerent producing countries move to-
gether much more closely than prior to liberalization. It also implies that
markets in each producing country are more closely interconnected than
previously, with the result that decisions taken in one country aﬀect farm-
ers in each of the other producing countries. We refer to these two aspects
of liberalization as globalization. Governments decided (or agreed) to lib-
eralize, while globalization was a consequence of these decisions and not
an objective in itself.
For commodity markets, liberalization has meant reducing government
involvement in marketing and in production, increasing participation of
the private sector in these activities, and reducing distortions in commod-
ity prices, especially producer prices. Measures implemented to achieve
these goals vary, but often they have included the elimination of govern-
ment marketing agencies, the introduction of competition in marketing,
the elimination of administered prices, reduction in explicit and implicit
taxes, and the privatization of government-owned assets.
Events triggering market liberalization were not independent of broader
political and economic changes in most countries, and the consequences of
liberalization are often linked as well. However, issues related to the ap-
proaches and eﬀects of general and agricultural market liberalization have
been discussed elsewhere and receive minimal treatment here (for full
treatment, see World Bank 1994; Engberg-Pedersen et al. 1996; and Mos-
ley, Harrington, and Toye 1991). Instead, our purpose is to discuss mar-
ket liberalization in the speciﬁc context of cocoa and, particularly, to ex-
amine the impact of liberalization on the prices obtained by west African
cocoa producers and the revenues they receive. We also empirically esti-
mate supply and demand elasticities for west African producers and use
these to simulate the welfare eﬀects of liberalization on west African cocoa
producers, non-African producers and world consumers of cocoa prod-
ucts, and the revenue loss to west African governments.
West Africa accounts for nearly two-thirds of the world’s cocoa produc-
tion. Before the late 1980s, west African cocoa was entirely produced and
marketed under government-controlled systems. However, starting in the
late 1980s and continuing into the 1990s, all four of west Africa’s largest
cocoa-producing countries—Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Ni-
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liberalizing their cocoa markets. Much of the aim of the reforms was to im-
prove eﬃciency by reducing domestic marketing costs, provide a higher
pass-through of international prices to producer prices, and increase the
producer share of the free on board (f.o.b.) price. According to Akiyama et
al. (2001), market liberalization in cocoa had a positive eﬀect on producer
prices, relative to both f.o.b. prices and production.
The claimed increase in production raises the question of whether or not
liberalization by the west African producers, despite the relative rise in pro-
ducer prices, may have led to a net loss in total welfare in these countries as
the result of the likely negative impact of the production increase on the
world cocoa price. To the extent that this occurred, the incidence of the
beneﬁts from liberalization will have been on cocoa consumers, most of
whom are in the developed market economies. Developed country govern-
ments already have to counter the charge of hypocrisy (“incoherence,” in
oﬃcial parlance) in that they advocate market liberalization in the Third
World while maintaining regulated and subsidized domestic agricultural
markets. If it is also the case that the incidence of the liberalization bene-
ﬁts is signiﬁcantly enjoyed by developed-country consumers, it may be
diﬃcult to avoid the impression that these governments and the interna-
tional agencies are guilty of pursuing self-interested policies in the devel-
oping world.
This is an instance of the well-known adding-up problem. Here, the
problem arises as the welfare eﬀects of unilateral liberalization by an indi-
vidual and relatively small cocoa producer will diﬀer from and be lower
than the welfare eﬀects of multilateral liberalization by a group of produc-
ing countries, which collectively constitute a large proportion of the world
market. In the former case, it may be reasonable to take the world price as
unaﬀected by the liberalization, while in the latter case, this assumption
would be absurd. The adding-up problem has generated a large literature
starting from Johnson (1953, 1958) and Bhagwati (1958) and, more re-
cently, Krishna (1995). Schiﬀ (1994) states that countries with market
power in commodities should proceed with trade and domestic liberaliza-
tion and should apply optimal export taxes to those commodities in which
they have market power. Akiyama and Larson (1994) argued as a practical
matter that it is not feasible to design a regional commodity-production
and trade policy for cocoa-producing countries in Africa mainly because
of the diﬃculty of equitably distributing the beneﬁts of such a policy.
In a related literature, Evenson (2002) looks at the impact of technology
on agricultural prices. He ﬁnds that there are signiﬁcant costs to countries
that do not adopt new technology because they suﬀer from low prices and
lack of production growth. New technologies have led to lower prices, but
countries that have adopted new technologies have beneﬁted from ex-
panded production. Liberalization has lowered marketing costs and mar-
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duction should therefore also be similar. Countries cannot aﬀord to be left
behind in this process.
The choice of cocoa to examine these questions is deliberate and ad-
vised.
• Along with coﬀee, rice, sugar, and wheat, cocoa has historically been
one of the most heavily regulated commodity markets.
• In common with coﬀee, but unlike sugar and wheat, it is almost en-
tirely a developing-country commodity.2
• Unlike coﬀee, regulation was predominantly at a national rather than
an international level.3
• The liberalization process can be fairly cleanly dated in the cocoa mar-
ket. The rice, sugar, and wheat markets remain less fully liberalized.
It is our belief that the concentration of production in four west African
countries, all of which had heavily regulated internal markets, makes it
likely that the adverse (from the point of view of the liberalizing countries)
adding-up eﬀects of liberalization will be both larger and more clear than
in any other major market.
The present paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the eco-
nomics of liberalization, while section 4.3 highlights certain aspects of the
world cocoa market, particularly in relation to market liberalization. In
section 4.4, we look at the direct consequences of liberalization and glob-
alization in the world cocoa market. Section 4.5 presents a world cocoa-
market model, and section 4.6 indicates the beneﬁciaries of market liber-
alization based on the results of the model simulations. Section 4.7
concludes.
4.2 The Economics of Market Liberalization
The market-liberalization programs enjoined upon developing-country
governments in the markets for tropical commodities had two comple-
mentary objectives. The ﬁrst was to ensure that farmers would receive a
higher proportion of world prices than had been the case in the preliberal-
ization period. This often involved a reduction in (implicit or explicit) ex-
port tax rates. The second objective was to align incentives with world
prices, both for farmers and more generally in the marketing chain, with
the expectation that production and marketing would be more eﬃcient. It
was hoped that these incentives would increase both production and rev-
enues in the liberalizing economies. This price-realignment process in-
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2. There is a very small quantity of OECD cocoa production in Australia.
3. See Gilbert (1987, 1996) for a discussion regarding international commodity-market reg-
ulation in cocoa and coﬀee.volved an ending of previous interannual, intra-annual, and intranational
(interregional) price stabilization arrangements and paralleled the simul-
taneous abandonment of attempts to stabilize international prices through
commodity agreements. At the same time, previously monopsonistic mar-
keting systems were opened up to competition. See Akiyama et al. (2001)
and Gilbert and ter Wengel (2001) for a summary of these developments.
Market liberalization is part of the globalization phenomenon in that
producers of tropical commodities now react in a more or less uniform
manner to a common world price whereas, previously, domestic and inter-
national marketing arrangements often shielded them from the world
price.
The practical eﬀects of market liberalization are often both complicated
and controversial. We will accept that liberalization has indeed increased
the farmers’ share of the port (f.o.b.) price, because of both reduced taxa-
tion and reductions in marketing cost. Varangis and Schreiber (2001) dis-
cuss the cocoa outcomes. The balance between these two eﬀects, the ﬁrst of
which is a transfer and the second a pure eﬃciency gain, undoubtedly
varies across commodities and also across countries for the same com-
modity.4
The globalization aspects of market liberalization align domestic prices
more closely with the volatile world cocoa price, and the reining back of the
marketing boards and caisses de stabilisation (see section 4.3) reduces gov-
ernments’ capacities to oﬀset this volatility. The consequence is that farm-
ers, in general, will be more exposed to commodity-price variability. This
imposes additional costs on them, both through the costs of uncertainty as
well as from the direct costs of low prices (see Gilbert 2002). We make the
standard assumption that developing-country farmers lack access to either
credit or risk-management instruments. They are therefore obliged to self-
insure through diversiﬁcation.5
Proponents of liberalization hoped and intended that, by ensuring that
farmers would get a higher share of f.o.b. prices, they would be better oﬀ.
The farmers themselves note that, in practice, they have been rewarded by
a higher share of a lower price. They often go on to argue that they are no
better oﬀ and perhaps worse oﬀ than before liberalization. Of course, be-
cause prices are volatile, these complaints are more often heard in low-price
than in high-price years. It is also possible to respond with the counterfac-
tual argument that, because of continued productivity advances in tropical
agriculture, prices would have fallen relative to the prices of manufactures
in the absence of liberalization so that, even if it is true that farmers are no
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4. There are also arguments, which we do not explore in this paper, that market liberaliza-
tion may have resulted in a deterioration in crop quality (see Gilbert and Tollens 2003).
5. It might be suggested that even if farmers lack access to credit, they are always able to
save in good times, but not in bad times (see Paxson 1993). However, the almost complete ab-
sence of rural banks in West Africa makes it diﬃcult even to save.better oﬀ than previously, they are at least better oﬀ than they would have
been in the absence of liberalization. In our experience, it is diﬃcult to per-
suade developing-country farmers that this is more than self-justifying
sophistry. Furthermore, farmers believe that the fall in tropical-commodity
prices has been induced in large measure by the liberalization process itself.
It is easy to see why this should be the case. Holding the world price con-
stant, the farmers will be willing to supply more at that world-price level to
the extent that market liberalization has increased the price obtained by
those farmers. They can do this either by exploiting existing capital more
intensively (by increased application of eﬀort and purchased inputs) or by
expanding the area under cultivation. The supply curve from the liberaliz-
ing country therefore shifts right and, so long as the supply of the liberal-
izing country is not negligible compared to world supply, the aggregate
supply function will also shift right. This will induce a fall in the world price
which will be larger to the extent that (a) a signiﬁcant fraction of world pro-
duction is aﬀected in this way and (b) the demand curve is inelastic.
This is a standard instance of the old Johnson (1953, 1958) and Bhagwati
(1958) adding-up problem. If one conﬁnes attention to market liberaliza-
tion in a single “small” country, it is legitimate to hold the world price con-
stant, at least as a ﬁrst approximation. However, if one considers liberal-
ization either in a major producer of the commodity or in a signiﬁcant
group of individually small producers, it will be important to take into ac-
count the eﬀect on the world price. The implication is that the sum of the
beneﬁts to each of the individual liberalizers, under the assumption the
world price does not change, will exceed the actual total welfare eﬀects in
the liberalizing countries, taking into account the decline in the world co-
coa price. Proponents of liberalization have always admitted the principle
of this argument but have proceeded on the basis that the adding-up eﬀect
is of the second order of importance. Instead, the anti-liberalizers may be
interpreted as suggesting that the adding-up costs are of a comparable or-
der to the original liberalization beneﬁts, and indeed that they may even ex-
ceed these beneﬁts (see ﬁgure 4.1 where supply shifts from S to S  and the
world price falls from P to P ).
It is straightforward to obtain a ﬁrst-order approximation for the size of
the adding-up eﬀect.6 The international price of the commodity is P; the
domestic-producer price in producing country jis pj( j 1, . . . , n); and the
production in country jis Qj Qj(pj,  j), where we have supposed that pro-
duction depends not only on the price received by farmers in j, but also on
the variability of the price as measured by the log standard deviation of do-
mestic prices. The aggregate (world) demand for the commodity is D(P).
Suppose the eﬀects of liberalization on the level of the domestic price in
country j can be represented as
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6. The estimates reported in section 4.6 are based on exact numerical solution of the model.(1)   ln pj   ln P    j,
This equation states that the direct eﬀect of liberalization is to raise the pro-
ducer price in the country by the proportion  j, but there may also be an in-
direct eﬀect through the (negative) impact of liberalization on the world
price P.7 Making the reasonable assumption that liberalization has no
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The supply elasticity in country j is εj   ∂ ln Qj/∂ ln pj, the volatility semi-
elasticityis  j ∂ ln Qj/∂ j, and the aggregate price elasticity of demand is
  –∂ ln D/∂ ln P, and we deﬁne the production share of country j as  j
 Qj/Σn
i 1Qi. Using this notation, we may approximate equation (3) to give
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Fig. 4.1 The price impact of market liberalization
7. It is possible that this volatility eﬀect may be suﬃciently large as to dominate the impact
of the higher price on production. This would result in an increase in the world price (see New-
bery and Stiglitz 1981, 327–29). Kanbur (1984) shows that in the case of cocoa, under plaus-
ible assumptions, the risk beneﬁts from stabilization are lower than the transfer beneﬁts.Consider the simple case in which supply elasticities and volatility semi-
elasticities are equal in all producing countries. Suppose further that there
are m liberalizing countries (aggregate share  ) each of which sees pro-
ducer prices rise relative to the world price by a uniform amount of   and
price volatility rise by the uniform amount  . By implication, there are n –
m nonliberalizers with share 1 –  . Equation (4) simpliﬁes to
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Consider ﬁrst the case in which production is unaﬀected by changes in
price variability (  0). A unilateral liberalization by a small producer will
be associated with a value of   close to zero. The impact on the world price
will be negligible, and the incidence of the producer price will be entirely
on the producers in the liberalizing country. However, the larger the share
of the liberalizing countries and the higher the supply elasticities relative to
the demand elasticity, the greater the dissipation of the eﬀects of liberal-
ization through decline in the world price. The limiting case is if demand is
completely inelastic (  0), and the entire set of producers liberalize (  
1). In this case,   ln pj   0 ( j   1, . . . , n) and   ln P   – , implying that
liberalization results in a transfer from producing-country governments to
consumers with farmers unaﬀected. Farmers are never made worse oﬀ by
liberalization, but they may not be much better oﬀ. Consumers will always
be better oﬀ, and producing-country governments worse oﬀ. Depending
on the welfare weight given to government, producing countries as a whole
may well be worse oﬀ.
Allowing a production response to increased volatility reduces the im-
pact of globalization on the world price, hence raising local prices ceteris
paribus, but also opens the possibility that liberalization may worsen the
position of farmers.
4.3 The World Cocoa Market and Cocoa-Market Liberalization
Cocoa is a tropical-tree-crop commodity. Furthermore, it is the west
African crop par excellence. Côte d’Ivoire is the single largest producer and
exporter of cocoa and Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Cameroon, to-
gether, are responsible for over 60 percent of world production (see ﬁgure
4.2, which gives averages for the 1990s). In west Africa, cocoa is almost
entirely a smallholder crop. All four of the major west African cocoa-
producing countries had regulated marketing structures that they inher-
ited from their colonial administrations. The major non-African cocoa ex-
138 Christopher L. Gilbert and Panos Varangisporters are Indonesia (the second most important exporter) followed by
Malaysia and Brazil where, for diﬀerent reasons, production has been de-
clining.
The standard crop marketing structure adopted in countries with a
British colonial history was of monopoly-monopsony marketing boards.
In the ex-French colonies ownership of the crop remained with the private
sector, but the state intervened by setting producer and export prices, by is-
suing export licenses, and by stabilizing prices through a caisse de stabili-
sation. In cocoa, Ghana and Nigeria operated marketing boards, while
Côte d’Ivoire operated a caisse system. Cameroon, which combines ex-
British and ex-French colonial territories, adopted a hybrid model. Mar-
keting boards and caisses were never a feature of non-African cocoa-
producing countries.
Marketing board and caisse structures were justiﬁed in terms of price
stabilization (interyear and intrayear), quality assurance, and provision of
services to farmers (subsidized-input purchase and extension). These sys-
tems came under signiﬁcant pressure over the 1980s and 1990s, in particu-
lar from the two major donor institutions—the World Bank and the Euro-
pean Union (EU), which was involved as the consequence of the Stabex
program established under the succession of Lomé Treaties with the ACP
(Asian, Caribbean, and Paciﬁc) group of countries.
Donor pressure is often seen as having been ideologically motivated,
and there is no doubt an element of truth in this, although it is diﬃcult to
argue that the EU has always exhibited an overriding general commitment
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Fig. 4.2 Cocoa production 1990–1991 to 1999–2000to liberalized agricultural markets. In any case, other factors were of
greater importance.
• Primary-commodity prices were at historically low levels in the second
half of the 1980s. The cocoa price fell more or less steadily from its
1977 peak to a low in the early 1990s, and subsequently has recovered
only to a modest extent. Stabilization agencies that attempted to
maintain cocoa-producer prices at levels that had been feasible in the
1970s and early 1980s consequently found themselves in ﬁnancial
problems. In certain countries, these were exacerbated by the fact that
accumulated stabilization surpluses from earlier years had typically
been “invested” in illiquid and poorly performing assets. The result
was that a number of boards and caissesbecame technically insolvent.
• Marketing-board and caisse arrangements were viewed as nontrans-
parent. Accounts were often late and opaque. It was diﬃcult to distin-
guish taxes, which were potentially available to ﬁnance government
expenditure, from marketing costs.
• The stabilization agencies became large organizations, often exercis-
ing signiﬁcant political power and absorbing a substantial share of
countries’ cocoa-export earnings. Cocoa-marketing costs were there-
fore signiﬁcantly higher in African producing countries than else-
where, and there was reason to suppose that this involved a signiﬁcant
element of rent extraction. For example, Williams (1985) wrote of the
Nigerian agricultural-marketing boards shortly before their abolition
in 1986, “They have replaced the European ﬁrms at the apex of the
buying system and shaped it to serve the needs of ruling parties, gov-
ernments and the Northern aristocracy to expand and consolidate
their networks of patronage” (13).
• Farmers have the residual claim on crop revenues. Falling world prices
in conjunction with an unchanged marketing wedge exerted signiﬁ-
cant downward pressure on farm incomes.
• Stabilization also proved to be expensive for farmers. For them, stabi-
lization often meant lower overall prices in exchange for stable prices.
McIntire and Varangis (1999) evaluated the trade-oﬀ between stabil-
ity and level of prices for the case of Côte d’Ivoire. They found that the
beneﬁts of stable prices did not compensate for the overall lower level
of prices paid to the Ivorian cocoa farmers.
Donor institutions balked at reﬁnancing the insolvent stabilization
agencies, perhaps in part because they preferred free markets, but also be-
cause it was clear that the major beneﬁciaries of reﬁnancing would be the
stabilization agencies, themselves, and the political causes they espoused.
Furthermore, nontransparency made it diﬃcult to account for uses of
funds provided. Farmers were seen by the donors as being poorly repre-
sented in the African political process, particularly in countries where
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seen as a means of reducing marketing costs and raising farmers’ share of
the f.o.b. price.
The ﬁrst African cocoa liberalization was that of Nigeria in 1986. Al-
though the World Bank had argued that the Nigerian agricultural-
marketing boards were ineﬀective and had sought their abolition as part of
a structural adjustment program, the Nigerian government rejected that
program but decided to abolish the marketing boards unilaterally. The
World Bank would have preferred agricultural liberalization to be se-
quenced after foreign-exchange liberalization, which was not implemented
at that time. There was little preparation for liberalization, and the process
is regarded as having been unnecessarily chaotic (see Gilbert 1997).
Cameroon, the smallest of the major African producers, was next to
move. This liberalization took place in stages starting in 1989 and con-
cluding in 1995 (see Gilbert 1997 for details). The major impetus to liber-
alization was the insolvency of the stabilization agency, the Oﬃce National
du Commercialisation des Produits de Base (ONCPB), which had respon-
sibility for coﬀee as well as cocoa. The EU made replacement of the ON-
CPB by an organization with a more limited role (the Oﬃce National du
Café et du Cacao; ONCC) a condition of Stabex ﬁnancial support and re-
quired a sharp reduction in the price oﬀered to farmers. The World Bank
was never signiﬁcantly involved with the Cameroon cocoa sector. Unlike
the Nigerian liberalization, the Cameroonian reforms were never fully
“owned” by the government or the Cameroonian media, which has consis-
tently seen them as imposed by the donors. But despite the questionable
ownership of reforms in Cameroon and problems in Nigeria, cocoa farm-
ers in these two countries beneﬁted signiﬁcantly as prices paid to them rose
substantially following the reforms.
Both Nigeria and Cameroon may be seen as small producers (see ﬁgure
4.1). This cannot be said of Côte d’Ivoire. Ivorian cocoa policy was ad-
ministered through the Caisse de Stabilisation et du Soutien des Prix des
Produits Agricoles, normally known simply as the Caistab. Prior to 1989,
Ivorian cocoa prices were set at levels very similar to those in Cameroon,
partly reﬂecting the common currency, but possibly also on the basis of
common external advice. Caistab therefore experienced ﬁnancial problems
in the late 1980s similar to those of the Cameroonian ONCPB. However,
the EU was prepared to oﬀer greater assistance to the Ivorians. A sequence
of piecemeal reforms was made through the 1990s with the objective of
increasing the transparency of the process by which exporters bid for
déblocage (i.e., permission to export). Supposedly complete liberalization
came in 1999, largely as the consequence of World Bank insistence, al-
though in practice there has been considerable back-tracking on the spirit
of those commitments. As in the Cameroonian case, reform ownership re-
mains problematic.
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fall in cocoa prices attributed by many farmers and also by some govern-
ment oﬃcials and their advisors to the liberalization process. Our view,
which coincides with that of the cocoa industry, is that this price fall was
due to lack of growth in cocoa consumption and was completely unrelated
to the liberalization process.8 In any case, the fall in price led to signiﬁcant
civil disobedience and put pressure on the government to assist cocoa
farmers. Cocoa prices recovered sharply in 2001 and 2002 as consumption
rose in the context of weak production, which reﬂects the neglect of cocoa
trees during the previous low-price years.
Ghana is the remaining major African cocoa producer. Currently
(2003), it has only liberalized partially and tentatively. The Ghana Cocoa
Board, generally referred to as Cocobod, historically enjoyed monopsony-
monopoly power. Licenced private buyers are now permitted to operate,
but they are still required to sell to Cocobod and, in principle, are required
to buy from farmers at a uniform regulated price. Ghanaian farmers, how-
ever, are now obtaining a signiﬁcantly higher share of the f.o.b. price than
during the 1980s, reﬂecting a partial retreat from the interannual-
stabilization objective, some reduction in cocoa taxation, and a sharp fall
in the Cocobod establishment.
Ghanaian cocoa sells at a signiﬁcant premium relative to cocoa from
other origins, in part because of a good fat content, but most importantly
because of the reliability and rigor of Cocobod quality controls. These con-
trols depend in large measure on Cocobod’s monopoly-monopsony pow-
ers. Although there is an issue of the size of the Ghanaian premium in re-
lation to the cost of producing cocoa of this quality,9 the Ghanaians are
clearly correct to worry that liberalization could result in an erosion of this
premium.
4.4 The Direct Impact of Liberalization and Globalization
The complexity and diversity of the west African cocoa-market-
liberalization process makes it diﬃcult to identify the appropriate dates for
before-and-after comparisons. Liberalization is a legal act and can there-
fore be dated precisely—1986–1987 for Nigeria, 1989, 1991, and 1995 for
Cameroon, and 1999 for Côte d’Ivoire, with Ghana still to fully liberalize.
By contract, globalization is a process that is partially consequential on lib-
eralization, as in Nigeria and Cameroon, but that may also anticipate lib-
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8. Cocoa grindings were eﬀectively constant in 1998–1999 (2.77 tonnes against 2.78 tonnes
in 1997–1998), while production rose 4.5 percent over the same period (from 2.61 tonnes to
2.80 tonnes; ICCO 2002).
9. The major cost arises from the diversion of sub-export-quality beans to domestic pro-
cessing, for which purpose they are sold at what is believed to be a signiﬁcant discount to
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Fig. 4.3 Deﬂated cocoa producer prices and deﬂated ICCO indicator price 
(1985   100)
eralization if, as in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, administered prices are
brought increasingly into line with the world price.
Figure 4.3 charts producer prices in the four west African countries and
also the International Cocoa Organization (ICCO) indicator price, which
we interpret as the world price.10 It is apparent that these ﬁve prices have
moved much more closely together since 1990 than in earlier years. This vi-
sual impression is broadly conﬁrmed by the correlations shown in table 4.1.
The nonitalic correlations above the diagonal give correlations between the
proportionate price changes in the four producing countries over crop years
1968–1969 to 1985–1986 (the year prior to the Nigerian liberalization). The
italicized correlations beneath the diagonal give the same correlations over
crop years 1989–1990 to 1998–1999. The table also includes the correlations
with changes in the ICCO indicator price lagged one year. The table shows
the prices in Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana (as well as Nigeria, al-
though to a much lesser extent) moving much more closely together after
1990 than before 1986. The leading principal component of the four price-
change series accounts for 43.9 percent of the price variation prior to liber-
alization and 69.8 percent after liberalization. All four prices also move
more closely with the ICCO price in the postliberalization period.
On the basis of these ﬁgures, we conclude that the west African cocoa
10. The four producer prices are in domestic-currency units and are deﬂated by national
consumer price indexes. The ICCO price is in U.S.$ and is deﬂated by the U.S. CPI (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund [IMF] 2001). The ﬁve prices are measured as indexes normalized at
100 in 1990. There is, however, no implication that the ﬁve 1990 prices are equal.producers globalized, in the sense of moving to a common world-cocoa
price from the start of the 1990s. The Nigerian liberalization was three
years prior to this, and the institutional liberalizations in Cameroon and
Côte d’Ivoire came over the course of the following decade. However, cru-
cially, the start of the 1990s saw the move away from interannual price sta-
bilization in both these two countries (under EU pressure) and also in
Ghana. In the calculations that we report in section 4.6, we therefore re-
gard the period up to (and including) 1985–1986 as preglobalization and
the period from 1989–1990 to date as postglobalization.
The principal objective of liberalization was to raise the share of the
f.o.b. price received by farmers. There are two possible approaches to the
problem of measuring this impact.
• The ﬁrst approach is to take time averages of the shares of the pro-
ducer prices, converted into dollars, in the world price before and af-
ter liberalization. However, this exercise is complicated by the compli-
cated nonmarket-exchange-rate regimes operated by Ghana and
Nigeria over the periods of interest.
• The second uses point estimates of the shares of producer prices in
f.o.b.  port prices, both measured in local currency. This procedure
gives a clearer comparison but necessarily introduces a degree of arbi-
trariness in the dates selected for the comparison; it is apparent from
ﬁgure 4.1 that the extent to which the various producer prices were di-
vorced from the world price varies considerably over time.
We adopt the second of these procedures. Table 4.2brings together some
estimates of the eﬀects of liberalization on the farmers’ share of the f.o.b.
price. These ﬁgures allow comparison of the four liberalizing origins in
west Africa with Brazil, Indonesia, and Malaysia, which have no history of
internally regulated cocoa markets. Figures relating to liberalized markets
are italicized. There is broad agreement between the Ruf and de Milly
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Table 4.1 Price Correlations 1968–1969 to 1985–1986 (above diagonal) and
1989–1990 to 1998–1999 (beneath diagonal)
1968–1969 to 1985–1986
1989–1990 to 1998–1999 Cameroon Côte d’Ivoire Ghana Nigeria ICCO
Cameroon 0.1183 –0.0404 0.5161 0.6345
Côte d’Ivoire 0.4773 0.0816 0.3703 0.6035
Ghana 0.7011 0.8038 0.2950 0.0170
Nigeria 0.6395 0.4334 0.5061 0.6251
ICCO 0.8051 0.7820 0.7575 0.8115
Note: Correlations are between annual changes in the logarithms of the producer prices. The
ICCO price change is lagged one year.(1990) ﬁgures for 1989 and those taken from the World Bank, LMC Inter-
national,11and Gilbert and Tollens (1999). This comparison highlights not
only the sharp jump in the Cameroonian share after liberalization, but also
the steady increase in the Ivorian share prior to the formal liberalization in
the 1999–2000 season.
On the basis of these ﬁgures, we take the preliberalization shares in
Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire to be those given by Ruf and de Milly (1990)
and the postliberalization shares to be equal to the 81 percent average re-
ported by LMC for 1996. Ghana and Nigeria pose greater problems. In
Ghana, which has yet to fully liberalize, we lack a postliberalization share,
while for Nigeria, which liberalized before the Ruf and de Milly (1990) sur-
vey, we lack a preliberalization estimate. Furthermore, it is apparent from
ﬁgure 4.1 that Ghana had already commenced raising its producer-price
share prior to 1989. We take a starting value for both countries of 47 percent,
the nonliberalized average from Ruf and de Milly (1990), and see the Niger-
ian share rising by 41 percent to the LMC ﬁgure of 88 percent, with the
Ghanaian share rising by 34 percent to the LMC liberalized average of 81
percent.12These estimates are clearly orders of magnitude at best and should
be treated as such. The impact of rises in the producers’ share of the f.o.b.
price on actual producer prices will depend on the impact on the world price.
These increases in the farmers’ share of the world price result from two
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Table 4.2 Producer Prices as Share of F.O.B. Price (%)
Ruf and World Gilbert and
de Milly (1990) Bank LMC Tollens (1999)
1989 1994–95 1996 1998–99
Cameroon 41 71 75 73
Côte d’Ivoire 48 48 47 63
Ghana 52 49 56 56
Nigeria 74 72 88 90
Brazil 79 72 72 n.s.
Indonesia 87 78 78 88
Malaysia 72 94 91 n.s.
Average, liberalized 78.0 77.4 80.8 84.0
Average, nonliberalized 47.0 48.5 51.2 59.7
Liberalization eﬀect 31.0 28.9 29.6 24.3
Note: Figures relating to liberalized markets are italicized. n.s.   not stated.
11. The ﬁgures were received by private communication (LMC International is a commod-
ity consulting ﬁrm).
12. The very high LMC estimate of the share of the Nigerian producer price in the f.o.b.
price reﬂects the lack of dependence of the Nigerian government on taxes on agricultural ex-
ports. We would expect Ghana to continue to tax cocoa-export revenues even after full liber-
alization. Note that, because intermediation costs are largely independent of the cocoa price,
the producer share, which is a residual, will be positively correlated with the price.separate eﬀects. The ﬁrst is cost reductions arising out of more eﬃcient in-
termediation. The second is the reduction in taxation. One might, in prin-
ciple, regard the administrative expenses of the stabilization agencies as
either taxation or as an intermediation-cost item—we follow the latter
approach. Figure 4.4, which is based on statistics taken from Gilbert and
Tollens (1999), shows the dramatic diﬀerences between tax levels in the two
nonliberalized countries (Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana) compared with that in
the liberalized economies. On the basis of these statistics, we estimate that
75 percent of the increase in the producers’ share in the liberalization pro-
cess arises from reduced taxation.
That estimate is conjectural. Reductions in intermediation costs are im-
portant in the welfare analysis we perform in section 4.6 because these may
be interpreted as eﬃciency gains, while reductions in taxation generate
transfers. Relatively little information is available on the scale of these ben-
eﬁts. Gilbert and Tollens (1999), who interviewed new and established co-
coa exporters in Cameroon, estimated that intermediation costs had fallen
by 5 percent (relative to the producer price) in the three years following full
liberalization.13
Globalization will also have aﬀected, and generally increased, the vari-
ability of the prices received by farmers. Figure 4.5 shows the uncondi-
tional, interannual, logarithmic standard deviations of the four (deﬂated)
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Fig. 4.4 Taxes and marketing costs as shares of the producer price, 1998–1999
13. They attributed these diﬀerences to the fact that newer exporters utilized less capital
and made greater use of specialized intermediaries (such as transportation companies). De-































































nproducer prices before and after globalization. Farmers in Cameroon have
experienced the largest increase in price variability—a 32 percent rise from
12 percent to 44 percent. Instead, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria have seen
more modest rises, while volatility in Ghana has actually fallen. This last,
paradoxical, ﬁnding is the consequence of the lack of success of Cocobod
in its declared stabilization objective during the 1980s, when sharp move-
ments in inﬂation movements resulted in the supposedly stabilized domes-
tic price becoming, in real terms, more variable than the world price. Note
that, except in Ghana, where the nominal producer price continues to be
ﬁxed for the entire crop-year, the ﬁgures tabulated in ﬁgure 4.4 may under-
estimate the extent to which the increase in variability experienced by
farmers since liberalization has also increased intra-annual-price variabil-
ity.
Figure 4.4 also reports the variability of the world (ICCO indicator)
price over the same period. The modest decline in world-price variability
implies that the rises in Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Nigeria cannot be
attributable to any greater variability in the postglobalization world price.
4.5 A Model of the World Cocoa Market
Because our interest is in the four major west African producing coun-
tries that have liberalized their cocoa sectors, our strategy is to model pro-
duction in these countries in detail but to embed these equations in what is
otherwise a highly aggregated world model. A beneﬁt of this approach is
that we do not need to make gratuitous assumptions about other aspects
of the cocoa market. A cost is that highly stylized modeling of consump-
tion and non-African production may distort our results.
For each of the four origins (j   1, . . . , 4) we consider, we model pro-
duction Qjt in period t as a linear function of a quadratic time trend, cur-
rent and lagged expected prices, and price volatility.






     j3Et 1 ln P jt    j4Et 2 ln P jt 1
   j5 jt   ujt
The quadratic trend is required to account for the declines and subsequent
rises in production in Ghana and Nigeria. It may be argued that these
changes were determined, in fact, by the movements in producer prices in
those countries; if this is so, these eﬀects arise from the cumulative eﬀects
of prices over a long period and are not easily modeled in terms of simple
lag distributions. In any case, part of these two declines and the subsequent
reversals reﬂect changes in infrastructure investment, the provision of ex-
tension, and other factors that cannot be directly related to price levels.
The expected producer prices Et–1 ln P jtand Et–2 ln P jt–1in equation (7) are
148 Christopher L. Gilbert and Panos Varangisgenerated as the one-period predictions from estimated trend-augmented
ﬁrst-order autoregressions.
(8) ln P jt    0    1 ln P j,t 1   vjt
Equation (8) is estimated separately for each country for the preglobaliza-
tion and postglobalization periods.14 This speciﬁcation supposes that
farmers form price expectations rationally on the basis of the limited in-
formation set consisting of the local price history and without any need to
learn the price processes.15In principle, one would expect only the current-
period expectations Et–1 ln P jt to explain production, but in practice the
lagged expectation Et–1 ln P jt–1 is also required.
The price volatility   jt is the unconditional standard deviation of pro-
portionate price changes in country j estimated separately for the pre- and
postglobalization periods.16 The expected sign of the coeﬃcient  j5 is neg-
ative as farmers self-insure by diversifying eﬀort away from the risky crop.
The estimated-price autoregressions (equation [8]) are given in table 4.3.
The divide between the preglobalization sample I and the postglobaliza-
tion sample II is taken as between the 1988–1989 and 1989–1990 crop years
for Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana, and between the 1986–1987 and
1987–1988 crop years for Nigeria. The trend terms are dropped from the
Cameroonian and Ivorian price autoregression equations, as they are in-
signiﬁcant (real producer prices in these two countries dropped sharply in
1989, but not within the two samples). Chow tests give clear rejections of
sample homogeneity for Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire, but not for Ghana,
where full liberalization has yet to take place, or (more surprisingly) for
Nigeria.17
Estimates of the production equations (equation [7]) are given in table 4.4.
The ﬁrst set of estimates for each origin employs ordinary least squares
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14. The time periods are as follows: Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire, 1960–1961 to 1988–1989
and 1990–1991 to 1998–1999; Ghana, 1964–1965 to 1988–1989 and 1989–1990 to 1999–2000;
Nigeria, 1968–1969 to 1985–1986 and 1988–1989 to 1998–1999; and the ICCO, 1962–1963 to
1988–1989 and 1989–1990 to 2000–2001.
15. We explored two alternative speciﬁcations for the price-expectations variables. The ﬁrst
was to allow the preliberalization expectations to be formed on the basis of actual, an-
nounced, nominal-producer prices in conjunction with a rational expectation of the rate of
inﬂation. This speciﬁcation gave a signiﬁcantly inferior ﬁt in the production equations. The
second alternative was to allow price expectations to be formed on the basis of the lagged
world (i.e., ICCO indicator) price in addition to the lagged domestic price. This gave qualita-
tively similar results for the estimated production equations to the speciﬁcation employed and
was marginally inferior in terms of ﬁt for Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana, and margin-
ally superior for Nigeria.
16. An alternative would have been to use a volatility conditional on generalized autore-
gressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH). The only price equation that showed evi-
dence of GARCH eﬀects and was the preliberalization equation for Cameroon.
17. The diﬀerences between the two samples are more evident in the set of estimates (not
reported) based on the speciﬁcation that also includes the lagged world price. These estimates
show the burden of the dependence shifting from the lagged domestic price in sample I to the




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.(OLS). The coeﬃcient  23in the Ivorian equation, where the unrestricted es-
timate was negative, was set to zero. The signiﬁcance of the individual-price
coeﬃcients for the remaining three origins is not high in every case, but the
joint signiﬁcance of the two coeﬃcients, examined by the standard F-test, is
high. Estimated supply elasticities  j3   j4vary from 0.26 (Côte d’Ivoire) to
0.71 (Ghana).
These single-equation estimates suﬀer from two problems.
• They result in diﬀerent supply elasticities for the diﬀerent origins. It is
plausible to argue that these diﬀering estimated responses reﬂect sam-
pling error rather than genuine diﬀerences in farmers’ behavior.
• They do not permit estimation of the volatility eﬀects (since the
volatility variable for a single country is indistinguishable from a shift
dummy at the sample break).
We address these two problems by reestimating the model as a system us-
ing full information maximum likelihood (FIML).18 The system estimates
allow us to impose the restriction of equal supply elasticities across all four
producing countries.
(9)  j3    j4    13    14 (j   2, 3, 4)
It also allows us to estimate the volatility coeﬃcients by imposing the re-
strictions
(10)  j5    15 (j   2, 3, 4).
The estimated equations using the FIML procedure are given in the sec-
ond set of country columns in table 4.3. The (uniform) estimated supply
elasticity is 0.43, and the volatility response is estimated as –0.24, in both
cases the coeﬃcients being signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. A standard
likelihood-ratio test establishes that coeﬃcient restrictions in equations (9)
and (10) are acceptable.19
Ideally, we should also estimate supply elasticities for the remainder of
the world. Unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain producer-price
series of suﬃcient length for the other major origins to estimate realistic
equations. This is in part a consequence of the fact that, in a liberalized
regime, domestic prices are not uniform and that there is seldom any oﬃ-
cial interest in collecting information on prices actually paid. Pursing the
alternative track of specifying equations in terms of the world (ICCO indi-
cator) price failed to generate a production elasticity that was either eco-
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18. A third problem is that the standard errors in the reported OLS regressions will suﬀer
from generated regressor bias (see Pagan 1984). We do not correct for this because we will be
primarily interested in the FIML estimates.
19. The most problematic restriction is that relating to the Ivorian price elasticity  24. One
may have some conﬁdence that the estimated volatility coeﬃcient is indeed measuring a
volatility eﬀect due to the fact that volatility has declined in one the four origins (Ghana) in
the period since 1989, while it has increased in the remaining three origins.nomically or statistically signiﬁcant. Since it would be unreasonable to
suppose that non-African cocoa production is unresponsive to prices, we
have chosen to suppose that the estimated non-African elasticity is equal
to the elasticity previously reported for the major African origins.
We also require a demand-elasticity estimate. Apparent consumption of
cocoa is referred to in the trade as grindings. We estimate a standard, log-
arithmic, partial-adjustment-demand function relating aggregate world
grindings Gt to the gross domestic product (GDP) of the industrialized
countries (GDP t), a linear time trend, and the current-dollar world price
deﬂated by the U.S. consumer price index (CPI; PW t). The resulting esti-
mates only conform moderately well with theory—there is evidence of a
continuing shift in taste toward cocoa consumption at around 2 percent
per annum but no evidence that this is related to income, at least as mea-
sured by GDP.20 The estimated price elasticity is relatively small at 0.19.
This may seem surprising, but it should be noted that cocoa now only
makes up between 5 percent and 10 percent, by value, of a chocolate bar
and even less of a chocolate-covered confectionary product. Estimation is
by instrumental variables,21 treating the current world price as endoge-
nous. The estimated equation is (t-statistics in parentheses)
(11) ln Gt   4.1567   .0100t   0.4812 ln Gt 1
(3.73) (3.88) (3.50)
  0.5991  ln GDPt   0.0961 ln PW t
(1.71) (3.08)
Sample: 1969–1970 to 1998–1999
Standard errors: 0.0266
Instrument validity:  2(7)   3.04 [88.1%]
In section 4.6, we use the estimated elasticity from this equation in con-
junction with the supply-elasticity and volatility coeﬃcient from the FIML
estimates reported in table 4.3 to evaluate the eﬀects of globalization of the
cocoa market.
4.6 Incidence—Who Beneﬁted?
We consider two scenarios:
• Unilateral liberalization-globalization by each country considered
separately and
• Joint liberalization by all four origins.
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20. The t-statistic on the variable ln GDPt, dropped from equation, was 0.19.
21. We use as instruments the exogenous variables included in the production equations.
These are the current and lagged expected producer prices in the four west African origins
(only the lagged expected price for Côte d’Ivoire was dropped since the current price was in-
correctly signed from the Ivorian production equation) and the quadratic trend.As discussed in section 4.3, the actual liberalization process was less clear-
cut than this and indeed is still incomplete; globalization has—to some ex-
tent—anticipated full liberalization.
Table 4.5 collects together the parameter values that we use in the inci-
dence calculations. We do this in conjunction with equation (4) to estimate
the eﬀects of unilateral and joint (multilateral) liberalization, which are re-
ported in table 4.6. The small-country assumption appears reasonable for
Cameroon and Nigeria, where liberalization is seen as having depressed
the world price by 3 percent in each case, but not for Côte d’Ivoire, where
liberalization is seen as reducing the world price by 10 percent. Ghana,
where liberalization would push the world price down by 5 percent, is in-
termediate. It is notable that Nigeria and Cameroon were the ﬁrst major
African cocoa producers to liberalize and that liberalization was resisted
in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, where the spillover eﬀects onto the world price
are larger. The impact of increased volatility on the world price is seen as
small but nonnegligible. Turning to the multilateral liberalization, the
world price is seen as falling by 20 percent in conjunction with a weighted-
average rise in African producer prices of 76 percent.
The global-welfare impact of these changes may be analyzed by refer-
ence to ﬁgure 4.6, which has the world price on its vertical axes. The ﬁrst
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Table 4.5 Parameter Values
Côte Weighted
Cameroon d’Ivoire Ghana Nigeria Average Source
  increase in producers’ 
share of world price (%) 83 73 72 87 75 Table 4.2
ε production elasticity 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 Table 4.4
  demand elasticity 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 Equation (11)
  increase in price volatility (%) 32.2 13.7 –14.8 14.8 9.0 Figure 4.4
  volatility semi-elasticity 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 Table 4.4
  share of liberalizing countries  5.6 30.9 11.2 6.1 53.7 1985–86 to
in world production (%) (total) 1989–90
Table 4.6 Impacts of Unilateral and Multilateral Liberalization (%)
Côte Multilateral
Cameroon d’Ivoire Ghana Nigeria Impact
Producer price shock 95.0 56.8 66.8 84.4
Unilateral impact on 
world price –3.7 –12.4 –4.2 –3.3 –20.0
Impact of volatility shock 0.7 1.6 –0.6 0.3 2.0
Total unilateral impact –3.0 –10.8 –4.8 –3.0 –19.3
Net unilateral price rise 91.6 50.6 64.1 81.7
Net multilateral price rise 59.5 36.2 39.1 51.1

































































































dpanel (a) shows the non-African supply curve SR, while the second panel
(b) displays the preliberalization African supply curve SA, which is above
the marginal cost curve CAby the taxation wedge. The producer price is PA.
The initial world price is P but this falls to P  after liberalization.
We see liberalization as shifting the marginal-cost curve in the liberaliz-
ing economy down to CCA through cost reductions and as eliminating the
tax wedge. This shifts the postliberalization supply function to SSA, which
is coincident to the new marginal cost schedule CCA. The producer price is
shown as rising to PA .22World supply SWis the horizontal sum of SAand SR
(QW QA QR), which becomes SSWafter liberalization (see panel [c]). The
world-demand curve is DW. Production in the nonliberalizing economies
falls from QR to QR , and consumption rises from QW to QW . Ignoring the
complicating factor of price volatility, welfare changes are as follows.
Farmers in nonliberalizing economies: –A
Governments of liberalizing economies: –(C   D   E   F )
Farmers in liberalizing economies: E   F   G   H   I   J
Consumers: K   L   M
Provided we count one dollar to an African government as equivalent to
one dollar to an African farmer, the net beneﬁt to the liberalizing country
is (G   H)   (I   J) – (C   D). The country beneﬁts in net terms so long
as the eﬃciency gains (I   J) exceed the transfer to foreign consumers (C
  D). With the same assumption and noting that A   C   K and B   D  
L, the net world beneﬁt is B   (G   H)   (I   J)   M. Triangle B is the
eﬃciency gain from substituting low-cost cocoa in the liberalizing econ-
omies for higher-cost cocoa in the rest of the world; rectangle G   H is the
cost reduction on the original quantity QA in the liberalizing economies;23
triangles I   J represent the eﬃciency gain from cost reduction in the
liberalizing countries; and triangle M is additional consumer surplus aris-
ing from the lower world price.
We evaluate these quantities using the parameters displayed in table 4.5
and in relation to average price and production levels for the period 1985–
1986 to 1989–1990 (i.e., prior to the impact of all the liberalizations except
that of Nigeria). The eﬀect of liberalization-globalization on the world
price is obtained by numerical solution of the production and consump-
tion equations through the market-clearing identity. The results of this ex-
ercise are given in table 4.7 (unilateral, country-by-country liberalization)
and table 4.8 (multilateral liberalization and globalization by the four
African cocoa-producing countries). Table 4.9 gives a break down of the
estimated eﬃciency gains.
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22. If the cost reduction is large relative to the tax reduction, PA  can be beneath PA.
23. One might argue that G   H is not entirely a beneﬁt to the liberalizing economy if the
resources liberated by the cost reduction do not ﬁnd alternative use.Considering ﬁrst the unilateral liberalization calculations (table 4.7), the
major eﬀect is a transfer of resources from government to farmers. Farm-
ers beneﬁt most in Côte d’Ivoire (nearly $500 million per annum), followed
by Ghana (nearly $225 million per annum) and then Cameroon and Nige-
ria (around $125 million per annum). These beneﬁts are in proportion to
the size of the respective producing sectors. However, they are oﬀset by
governmental losses of tax revenue, which are of the same order of magni-
tude, so the net dollar beneﬁts to the countries are much smaller—a little
less than $40 million on an annual basis for each of Cameroon, Côte
d’Ivoire, and Nigeria, and a little more than $55 million for Ghana.24 The
Ivorian beneﬁts are relatively modest since the producer price is seen as ris-
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Table 4.8 Incidence of Multilateral Liberalization and Globalization Beneﬁts 
(annual $US millions)
Côte Africa Other Total
Cameroon d’Ivoire Ghana Nigeria Total Producers Consumers World
Beneﬁt to 
farmers 92.3 382.8 154.8 83.5 713.4
Beneﬁt to 
government –92.7 –446.5 –164.6 –89.7 –793.4
Total beneﬁt –0.3 –63.8 –9.8 –6.1 –80.0 –315.8 730.2 334.4
Total beneﬁt 
(%) –0.2 –5.7 –2.4 –2.9 –4.1 –18.6 20.1 9.2
Notes: Parameter values as in table 4.5. Prices and quantities are averages of 1985–1986 to 1989–1990.
Percentage beneﬁt is relative to average revenues or expenditures over that period. Blank cells indicate
that no eﬀects are calculated.
Table 4.7 Incidence of Unilateral Liberalization Beneﬁts (annual $US millions)
Relation to Côte
Figure 4.6 Cameroon d’Ivoire Ghana Nigeria
Beneﬁt to farmers E   F   G   H   I   J – N 130.8 486.3 221.4 126.8
Beneﬁt to government –(C   D   E   F ) –92.7 –446.5 –164.6 –89.7
Total producing 
country beneﬁt (G   H )   (I   J) – (C   D) – N 38.2 39.8 56.8 37.1
Beneﬁt to other 
African producers A (part) –53.2 –89.3 –74.7 –52.3
Beneﬁt to non-
African producers A (part) –51.2 –180.6 –81.2 –50.8
Beneﬁt to consumers K   L   M 111.8 404.6 178.3 110.9
Total world beneﬁt B   G   H   I  J  M – N 45.5 174.6 79.1 44.9
Notes: Parameter values as in table 4.5. Area N is not identiﬁable on ﬁgure 4.6.
24. If one were to take the view that one dollar to a government is worth less than one dol-
lar to a smallholder farmer, then the producing countries would beneﬁt more substantially.158 Christopher L. Gilbert and Panos Varangis
Table 4.9 Analysis of Eﬃciency Gains (annual $US millions)
Unilateral
Cameroon Côte d’Ivoire Ghana Nigeria Multilateral
Allocation gains
Liberalizing producers 15.0 32.8 19.2 14.7 57.8
Other producers 0.7 6.9 1.7 0.7 15.2
Consumers 0.3 4.4 0.8 0.3 14.9
Cost reductions 30.9 148.8 54.9 29.9 264.5
Volatility costs –1.4 –18.3 2.6 –0.8 –17.9
Total 45.5 174.6 79.1 44.9 334.4
ing by less than in the other origins (the preliberalization level was higher),
and the price rise is dissipated to a greater extent through a fall in the world
price. Consumers, who are predominantly in the developed economies, are
seen as major beneﬁciaries, particularly from an Ivorian liberalization,
while nonliberalizing producers lose heavily. Total world beneﬁts are mod-
est and in broad proportion to sectoral size—around $45 million annually
from Cameroonian and Nigerian liberalizations, $80 million from Ghana-
ian liberalization, and $175 million from Ivorian liberalization. They are
dominated by the transfer beneﬁts both within the liberalizing economy
(from the government to farmers) and from nonliberalizing producers to
consumers.
Table 4.8 gives the estimated results of a multilateral liberalization. It is
important to note that this does not represent the actual experience to date
in that both Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana have both only partially liberalized
marketing and maintain export taxes. (The price shocks we list in table 4.5
are substantially greater than those observed to date in these two countries.)
The estimates given in table 4.8 therefore relate to a hypothetical full liber-
alization and not to the actual observed events. An analysis of the impact
of the actual liberalizations would be considerably more complicated and
would require a fully speciﬁed econometric model.
The estimates in table 4.8 show that although farmers would have bene-
ﬁted in each Cameroon, Ghana, and Nigeria, these beneﬁts are almost ex-
actly oﬀset by the losses of governmental tax revenue with the result that
the countries as whole would be slightly worse oﬀ. In Côte d’Ivoire, the rev-
enue loss so substantially exceeds the beneﬁt to farmers that the net loss is
unambiguous. As in the unilateral exercise, to the extent that government
cocoa revenues were spent on wasteful activities, the countries (taken as
wholes) may have beneﬁted in welfare terms even in this case. This must be
a judgmental matter. Nonliberalizing countries also are seen as losing rev-
enues, and their farmers would have been worse oﬀ. The major beneﬁciar-ies would have been consumers in the developed-market economies, who
would have beneﬁted to the order of $725 million per annum, around 20
percent of their cocoa expenditures.
The analysis of the net eﬃciency gains reported in table 4.9 shows that
cost reductions consequential on liberalization are the major source of net
beneﬁt. We have supposed that 25 percent of the increase in the producer-
price share may be attributed to cost reductions, but we acknowledge that
this ﬁgure is highly conjectural. Allocational gains in the liberalizing
economies are the next largest item. These arise from elimination of the tax
wedge between the producer price and marginal-production costs. Alloca-
tional gains in consuming and nonliberalizing producer countries are
small, reﬂecting low elasticities. The increased volatility arising out of glob-
alization imposes only small costs, except in Côte d’Ivoire.
These exercises assume that liberalizing governments totally eliminate
export taxes. The unilateral liberalization exercise reported in table 4.7
shows that Cameroon, Ghana, and Nigeria all beneﬁt from increasing pro-
duction and would therefore lose revenues from export taxes. In Côte
d’Ivoire, the net beneﬁt is small in relation to production, implying that
revenues would be broadly unaﬀected by restricting production. The re-
sults of the multilateral exercise reported in table 4.8 further show that the
four African producers would all beneﬁt substantially from a coordinated
restriction of production. This must be subject to the qualiﬁcations that
prolonged periods of high prices may provoke new production in other
countries (including countries that are not currently signiﬁcant cocoa ex-
porters) and that the conclusion will not follow if government revenues are
less highly valued than farmers’ incomes. However, our model, which is
speciﬁed as having isoelastic demand and supply functions, is not well
suited to the calculation of optimal export taxes.
4.7 Conclusions
Donor agents and the developed-country governments have exerted
considerable pressure on African producers of tropical export crops to lib-
eralize their internal marketing systems for these products. They have also
pressed for the elimination or reining back of intertemporal and interre-
gional stabilization schemes, which were seen as responsible for ﬁscal ex-
cess and manifest waste. The major objective of these liberalization pro-
grams has been to ensure that farmers obtain a higher share in the f.o.b.
prices for which the crop is sold at the ports.
Globalization of these markets is a direct consequence of liberaliza-
tion—the prices in the now liberalized markets move substantially more
closely together than did the preliberalized prices so that the world price
has become the eﬀective pricing basis in the producing as well as the con-
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ducing countries:
• The prices received by farmers have become more volatile (except in
Ghana, where the nominal price stabilization had been counter pro-
ductive). 
• The eﬀects of one country’s actions in the market have a much more
direct impact on farmers in other producing countries than previously.
This second aspect of globalization is the cause of the adding-up problem.
A cost-reducing market liberalization in a small producing country raises
the share of the world price obtained by farmers and has a negligible eﬀect
on the world price itself. However, if a country with a large share of the
world market liberalizes, this will shift the world-supply curve to the right
and, in conjunction with highly inelastic demand, will depress the world
price. Farmers will then ﬁnd that they obtain a larger share of a lower price.
The same is true if one considers multilateral liberalization in a large group
of individually small producers.
Cocoa is produced entirely in developing countries and largely in west
Africa, where a system of internal market regulation inherited from colo-
nial governments prevailed until the late 1980s. In our view, these unin-
tended consequences of globalization are likely to be more apparent in the
cocoa market than in any other commodity market. The ﬁrst African pro-
ducers to liberalize their internal cocoa-marketing systems were Nigeria in
1986 and Cameroon in 1989–1995, both of which had small shares in
world exports. Adding-up eﬀects were therefore unimportant. In 1999, af-
ter a long period of pressure, the donors pushed Côte d’Ivoire, the largest
producer with one-third of world production, into reluctant liberalization.
Ghana, which is also a signiﬁcant producer, still maintains signiﬁcant con-
trols. If both of these producers fully liberalize their markets, the impact
on the world price will be signiﬁcant. Our calculations indicate that the
world price would fall in total by around one third of the rise in producer
prices calculated on a constant world-price basis. This ﬁgure reﬂects the
inelasticity of demand and the high market share of the African produc-
ers.
Despite the projected fall in the world cocoa price, African farmers do
beneﬁt from liberalization, so in that sense the liberalization programs
achieve their intended objective. However, these beneﬁts are largely the
consequence of a transfer from governments to farmers. The net dollar
beneﬁt to the country is positive for a country that liberalizes unilaterally,
but the depressing eﬀect on the world price is such that these beneﬁts be-
come negative if all four African cocoa-producing countries liberalize. For
this reason, consumers, most of whom live in the developed-market
economies, turn out to be the major beneﬁciaries from lower cocoa prices.
The scale of this beneﬁt is substantial. The losers are non-African farmers
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countries. The overall eﬃciency gains to the world are dominated by cost
reductions consequent on liberalization, but it is diﬃcult to be conﬁdent
about the size of these gains.
One reaction to these results would be to argue that producing countries
are better advised not to liberalize their agricultural-export sectors, and
there are many who have taken this position. We regard this view as ill
advised. First, the policy is not obviously feasible since individual produc-
ing countries each do have an incentive to liberalize. (In cocoa, this incen-
tive is relatively small for Côte d’Ivoire.) The result is a classic Prisoners’
Dilemma in which the cooperative nonliberalization equilibrium is not
sustainable. But even if the African producers were able to devise an en-
forcement mechanism to support the nonliberalization equilibrium, they
would be unable to prevent increased production elsewhere, including
from countries that are currently not major cocoa exporters. Furthermore,
to the extent that liberalization does signiﬁcantly reduce production costs,
intermediation costs or both (and we have discussed some evidence that
suggests this is the case), nonliberalizing producers will ﬁnd that any com-
petitive advantage they currently possess will be steadily eliminated.
The development agencies have tended to see liberalization as a means
of redistributing resources back to farmers. We have shown, however, that
the incidence of the long-run beneﬁts of liberalization is predominantly for
developed-country consumers. It is therefore essential that liberalization
should be accompanied by policies that attempt to redress the unfavorable
redistributive eﬀects arising from global liberalization.
Our thesis is not about market liberalization per se, but about the global
impact of multilateral liberalizations by a group of commodity-producing
countries responsible for a large share of the world market. Liberalization
beneﬁts each country taken individually; but, with inelastic demand, mul-
tilateral liberalization shifts the beneﬁts away from the producers and to-
ward the consumers. At the country level, primary-producing developing
countries will feel that they have been cheated if, collectively, they do not
receive a signiﬁcant share of the beneﬁts. Political support for liberaliza-
tion will depend on the distribution of the gains both within the producing
countries themselves and on a global level. Governments need to apply
complementary policies to accompany liberalization, and the interna-
tional agencies should be prepared to advise and assist in this process.
Clearly, one case study is insuﬃcient to allow generalizations about
globalization even in the primary sector. Furthermore, we have focused on
cocoa as presenting what is possibly the most extreme case of an adverse
distributional impact. We hope that our analysis and results will shed light
on the globalization process aﬀecting all primary-commodity markets and
provide a benchmark against which other commodity markets and coun-
tries might be compared.
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Comment Joshua Aizenman
This interesting paper deals with a case study of the eﬀects of liberalizing
the cocoa market. The facts that make this study interesting are that cocoa
is produced exclusively by developing countries. The demand for cocoa is
relatively inelastic. The major suppliers are located in Africa. Hence, this
case study provides insight into the challenges facing attempts to liberalize
the production of major crops and commodities that are frequently domi-
nated by the supply of developing countries.
The objective of the liberalization was to increase farmers’ share of the
crop’s prices. Prior to the liberalization, most farmers obtained artiﬁcially
low prices for their crops as part of the operation of schemes intended to
tax exports, either for the direct beneﬁt of the taxpayer or for the indirect
beneﬁts of the holders of the quasi rent generated by this tax.
The liberalization was initiated by countries that are minor players in the
global market: Nigeria in 1986, and Cameroon in 1989–1995. The largest
producer, Ivory Coast (counting for one-third of the global share), liberal-
ized in 1999. Ghana, another large producer, still maintains controls.
By-products of the liberalization have been the following:
• The domestic price facing farmers moved closer to the international
price.
• The prices facing farmers are more volatile.
• Global supply rose, thereby reducing the global prices.
• Farmers are getting a greater share of a lower global price.
Globalization and International Commodity Trade 163
Joshua Aizenman is professor of economics at the University of California, Santa Cruz,
and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.The paper conducts an estimation of the global market for cocoa, and a
simulation in order to evaluate two scenarios: unilateral liberalization by
each country separately, and joint liberalization by all four countries. The
estimated eﬀects are as follows:
• African governments in the producing countries are worse oﬀ.
• African farmers and world consumers are better oﬀ.
• The losers are non-African farmers, and the agents in Africa that ben-
eﬁted from the quasi rents prior to the liberalization (taxpayers, agen-
cies, etc.).
• Multilateral liberalization would imply that the gains of the farmers in
the liberalized countries would be almost exactly oﬀset by the losses of
governmental tax revenue, with the result that the countries as a whole
should be slightly worse oﬀ. To the extent that government cocoa rev-
enues were spent on wasteful activities, the countries, taken as wholes,
will have beneﬁted in welfare terms even in this case.
• The world price would fall by about one-third of the rise in producer
prices. The major beneﬁciaries would have been the consumers in the
importing OECD countries, who would have beneﬁted on the order of
20 percent of their cocoa expenditure (about $0.7 billion per annum).
164 Christopher L. Gilbert and Panos Varangis
Fig. 4C.1 Optimal export tax for the African producers, and the welfare cost 
of liberalization
Notes: For simplicity, we assume a negligible share of domestic consumption of the major
supplies of Cocoa in Africa. Right-hand side: global demand and non-African supply of co-
coa. Left-hand side: the market for cocoa facing the African countries. Price A   world price
before liberalization; Price C  price paid to farmers before liberalization; A – C  export tax
prior to liberalization; and Price B   price paid to farmers after liberalization   world price
after liberalization. The rectangle is the tax revenue lost following liberalization; the trapezoid
is the farmers’ gain following liberalization; and the triangle is the welfare cost of liberaliza-
tion to African countries.Ignoring coordination costs and rent seeking, the optimal policy for the
African cocoa producers is to impose an export tax. This is a classical ap-
plication of the market power enjoyed by the “cartel” of cocoa producers.
As farmers are atomistic, the optimal policy requires an export tax, or the
adaptation of institutions that would deliver a similar outcome. Figure
4C.1 summarizes this argument. For simplicity, it is drawn for the case
where the share of domestic cocoa consumption is negligible relative to the
supply of the African exporting nations. The right-hand side plots the
world demand (W. D.) and the supply of the non-African producers
(N. A. S.). The left-hand side focuses on the situation confronting the
African exporters. The derived demand facing these exports is obtained by
the horizontal subtraction W. D. – N. A. S. The marginal revenue curve
corresponding to the derived demand is MR. The competitive supply of
cocoa of the African countries is the upward-sloping curve. The optimal
policy for the African cocoa-producing countries is to restrict the supply
to the level where the marginal cost equals the marginal revenue. This can
be accomplished by imposing an export tax of A – C. Such a tax will artiﬁ-
cially depress the prices facing the farmers, to the beneﬁt of the tax au-
thorities. A complete liberalization will eliminate the tax revenue (given by
the rectangle corresponding to the tax A – C), and will increase farmers’
rents by the trapezoid. The net welfare eﬀect is the diﬀerence between the
two, as is captured by the shaded triangle. Starting from the optimal tax,
the liberalization reduces welfare. The main beneﬁciaries are the world
consumers, beneﬁting by about $0.7 billion dollars a year.
Secondary beneﬁcial eﬀects of the liberalization may include a drop in
rent seeking associated with the “tax rectangle.” An issue that deserves fur-
ther attention is to what degree such beneﬁts had been observed in the re-
forming countries. Indeed, one wonders why the African countries would
not link the liberalization process with foreign aid (AIDS funds, education,
etc.).
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